Showing posts with label breach of contract. Show all posts
Showing posts with label breach of contract. Show all posts

Monday, March 8, 2021

Prescriptive easements, wrongful death, contracts and green curry lentil soup with shaved coconut

Appeals -- Jurisdiction -- District court -- Appeal from nonfinal order of county court ordering arbitration in small claims litigation and staying action until arbitration was completed, which appeal was transferred from circuit court to district court following statutory change in circuit court's appellate jurisdiction -- Motion to dismiss appeal, which was pending in circuit court at time of transfer and was premised on circuit court's lack of jurisdiction to review nonfinal orders, is denied, as district court has jurisdiction to hear appeal from nonfinal order compelling arbitration. DAVID L. MALLORY and PAULINE MALLORY, Appellants, v. ROBERT BRINCKERHOFF, individually, and MORGAN STANLEY SMITH BARNEY LLC, Appellees. 4th District.

Child custody -- Modification -- Competent substantial evidence supported trial court's modification of time-sharing -- Trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving mother ultimate decision-making authority as to medical issues if parties were unable to agree where court found that parties did not communicate and that their relationship was beyond acrimonious and considered other factors relating to father's conduct in connection with child's health care and knowledge of details concerning child's health care. CASSIO S. AIALA, Appellant, v. JAIME R. LARKIN, Appellee. 4th District.

Civil procedure -- Default -- Relief from judgment -- Appeals -- Timeliness -- Appeal of order denying motion to set aside default is dismissed as untimely -- Motion for rehearing of order did not toll the time for the filing of notice of appeal. KEVIN RHODY, Appellant, v. VEECO INSTRUMENTS, INC., Appellee. 5th District.

Civil procedure -- Default -- Vacation -- Trial court abused discretion in denying motion to vacate clerk's default where, prior to entry of default, there was correspondence between counsel for parties that indicated that defendant was represented by counsel and intended to defend suit. ACE FUNDING SOURCE, LLC, Appellant, v. A1 TRANSPORTATION NETWORK, INC., Appellee. 3rd District.

Civil procedure -- Summary judgment -- Affidavit in opposition to motion -- Declaration -- Where declarations submitted in opposition to summary judgment were based upon personal knowledge and sworn under penalty of perjury, and motion to exclude these documents was not made until summary judgment hearing, trial court erred in denying movant's motion for continuance to correct technical differences between a declaration and an affidavit in opposition -- Whether declarations, which are admissible under federal rules of civil procedure, are admissible in Florida summary judgment proceedings need not be decided in instant case. MICHAEL KING, Appellant, v. STANISLAV ZASLAVSKIY, Appellee. 3rd District.

Condominiums -- Assessment liens -- Foreclosure -- Damages -- Trial court erred when it adjudicated amount of damages owed to condominium association as a matter of law where there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether association was estopped from seeking pre-purchase assessments, fees, and costs based on purported representations regarding amount of outstanding assessments made by association's manager and president prior to defendant's purchase of unit. SVI TRUST, Appellant, v. WILLIAMS WALK CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee. 1st District.

Contracts -- Noncompete agreement -- Injunctions -- Temporary -- Temporary injunction order is facially deficient because it fails to include specific findings on each of the four required elements needed for issuance of an injunction -- Trial court erred in setting bond amount without conducting an evidentiary hearing. JOHN THOMAS PHELAN, JR., Appellant, v. TRIFACTOR SOLUTIONS, LLC, Appellee. 2nd District.

Corporations -- Injunctions -- Temporary -- Bond -- Replevin -- Monies -- Appeal of non-final orders denying defendants' motion for prejudgment replevin seeking to recover corporate funds that were intercepted by plaintiff and deposited in an undisclosed bank account, and granting a temporary injunction in favor of plaintiff which required defendants to provide plaintiff with health insurance -- Trial court erred in issuing temporary injunction where plaintiff did not request injunctive relief requiring the provision of health insurance -- An injunction entered in the absence of proper pleading and without an evidentiary hearing is a violation of due process -- Furthermore, injunction did not meet requirements of rule 1.610 -- Error to require plaintiff to pay bond without holding an evidentiary hearing -- While replevin was not available to recover deposited funds, defendants are entitled to possession of the checkbook and check card of the bank account where the funds were deposited -- Defendants established an immediate right to possession of the check card and checkbook where the bylaws of defendant corporation provided that the treasurer shall retain custody of corporate funds, and annual report shows that one of defendants was the treasurer -- Trial court improperly reasoned that alleged set-offs between plaintiff and defendants made forcing prejudgment conveyance of monies premature -- Recourse for potential set-off is money damages, not retention of property subject to replevin -- Additionally, trial court erred in analyzing defendant's motion for replevin under section 78.068 -- Section 78.068 was inapplicable because there was notice and hearing. THOMAS G. HINNERS, MARY J. WAMSER, and FLORIDA AFFORDABLE HOUSING, INC., Appellants, v. BRIAN J. HINNERS, Appellee. 4th District.

Dissolution of marriage -- Child support -- Income -- Requirement that former husband pay private school tuition for the parties' children reversed where evidence did not support former husband's ability to pay -- Trial court erred in failing to deduct rehabilitative alimony award from former husband's gross income for purposes of computing child support. RAMIZ MAALI, Appellant, v. GHARAM MAALI, Appellee. 5th District.

Dissolution of marriage -- Equitable distribution -- Businesses -- Valuation -- Goodwill -- Alimony -- No competent, substantial evidence supported trial court's valuation of the parties' insurance company -- Trial court's exclusion of company's liabilities in its determination of fair market value led to significant overvaluation of the company in equitable distribution plan -- Trial court's valuation of former husband's personal goodwill was not supported by competent evidence -- Expert's analysis of selected insurance company transactions contained in database and the reported values of the related noncompete clauses did not provide competent evidence to support trial court's determination of the amount of former husband's personal goodwill in company where expert did not provide any specific knowledge about the particulars of the insurance businesses that reported transactions in the database; did not disclose whether the owners of those businesses also sold insurance as former husband did; how involved the owners of those businesses had been with the companies; or anything about the day-to-day operations of those businesses -- Additionally, record showed that many transactions expert analyzed took place outside Florida, with some dating back almost twenty years -- Trial court erred in determining that former husband had the ability to pay amount of alimony awarded because, when determining former husband's gross income, trial court erroneously included all undistributed pass-through income from insurance company. MALCOLM C. KING JR., Appellant, v. KELSI KING, Appellee. 1st District.

Dissolution of marriage -- Equitable distribution -- Marital/nonmarital assets -- Valuation -- Liabilities -- Alimony -- Trial court erred in classifying personal injury settlement funds received during the marriage as former husband's nonmarital asset where former husband did not overcome statutory presumption that the funds were marital in nature -- Although it was former husband and not former wife who was injured in accident underlying personal injury settlement, that fact alone does not transform the nature of the funds from marital to nonmarital -- Trial court abused its discretion by including the personal injury funds in equitable distribution because they had been dissipated by the time of the dissolution hearing and there was no evidence that dissipation resulted from either party's intentional misconduct -- Trial court abused its discretion by awarding marital home, which was parties' only significant remaining marital asset, to former husband without making any specific finding of fact to justify the unequal distribution of the marital residence -- On remand, trial court should reconsider both the unequal distribution of the marital home as well as the award of credit to former husband for postseparation payments on the marital home where trial court gave no reason for awarding the former husband a credit for half of mortgage payments made since date of parties' separation -- Absent evidence to support former wife's passive-appreciation argument, former wife failed to establish an abuse of discretion in trial court's selecting of the parties' date of separation as the valuation date of the marital home based on finding that parties had been separated for three years, and that former husband had remained in the home making improvements without assistance from former wife -- Error to treat vehicle title loan taken out by former husband as a marital liability because former husband incurred the debt after petition for dissolution was filed -- Error to decline to award alimony to former wife without making statutorily required findings regarding need and ability to pay. MARY P. ROTH, Appellant, v. MARTIN R. ROTH, Appellee. 2nd District.

Dissolution of marriage -- Interim partial equitable distribution -- Roth and traditional IRAs -- Trial court erred by distributing parties' traditional IRA where neither party requested its distribution and there was no good cause to support it. BRIAN CALVARESE, Appellant, v. JOANNE KENNEDY CALVARESE, Appellee. 4th District.

Dissolution of marriage -- Marital settlement agreement -- Enforcement -- Contempt -- Failure to make lump sum alimony payments to spouse as required by marital settlement agreement -- Trial court erred in finding husband in contempt for failing to make lump sum alimony payments because, under MSA's plain language, payments were non-modifiable alimony payments to effect the equitable distribution of marital property and therefore not subject to enforcement by contempt -- Trial court erred in considering parol evidence regarding parties' intent where language of MSA was unambiguous -- Trial court properly found that former wife's claim was not barred by laches. ANDRES SUAREZ, Appellant, v. ELSA SUAREZ, Appellee. 3rd District.

Injunctions -- Contempt -- Trial court abused its discretion by finding that respondent was in contempt of injunction every time respondent traveled to respondent's property because the action brought respondent within 500 feet of petitioner's property -- Because original trial court's ore tenus explanation of its order imposing the injunction implied that respondent would not violate the 500-foot perimeter by merely passing petitioner's property while traveling through the neighborhood, injunction could not have effectively noticed respondent that said conduct would be prohibited. FRANCES OGDEN, Appellant, v. DONNA MINDREBO, Appellee. 1st District.

 Injunctions -- Domestic violence -- Due process -- Error to grant injunction for protection against domestic violence solely on basis of objected-to testimony that was not the subject of the petition for injunction. SKYLER P. WYNTER, Appellant, v. JAELYN GUTIERREZ, Appellee. 5th District.

Injunctions -- Mandatory -- Portion of injunction requiring respondent to immediately perform remediation measures is reversed where parties did not have a full opportunity to present their evidence on remediation issue -- Furthermore, remediation provision is deficient in that it fails to describe with reasonable detail the act or acts required to comply with the injunction. CENTER STATE TRANSPORTATION, INC., Appellant, v. MOTOR TREND ORLANDO SERVICE, LLC, Appellee. 5th District.

Insurance -- Bad faith -- Civil remedy notice -- Deficient notice -- No error in dismissing complaint against insurer based on finding that insured's civil remedy notice, which cited thirty-five statutory provisions and listed nearly every provision in insurance policy, failed to satisfy statutory requirement that an insured state with specificity the policy language and statutory provisions at issue -- Court rejects argument that notice was sufficient because the Department of Financial Services has statutory authority to return deficient notices but failed to do so -- Department's discretionary grant of authority did not determine the legality of the notice, nor is there evidence that the department even considered the issue -- Even if department made specific determination about notice's legality, the courts must independently review the notice. JUNIOR JULIEN, Appellant, v. UNITED PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. 4th District.

Insurance -- Personal injury protection -- Civil procedure -- Discovery -- Non-parties -- Action seeking declaration that plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendant insurer payments made by plaintiff's assignors that should have been made by insurer -- Trial court departed from essential requirements of law in finding that insurer had no standing to challenge plaintiff's non-party discovery requests where items sought belong to insurer pursuant to master agreement between insurer and non-party. GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY, et al., Petitioners, v. MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS, et al., Respondents. 3rd District.

Insurance -- Personal injury protection -- Declaratory action seeking declaration that plaintiff is entitled to recover from PIP insurer payments made by plaintiff's assignors that should have been made by insurer -- Jurisdiction -- Prohibition -- Petition for writ of prohibition seeking to prohibit court from exercising jurisdiction denied -- Where circuit court has jurisdiction of count of complaint for pure bill of discovery, court has jurisdiction of other counts which are limited to less than circuit court jurisdictional threshold -- Appeals -- Certiorari -- Discovery -- Defendant is not entitled to writ of certiorari to review order denying motion for protective order, as defendant has not demonstrated requisite irreparable harm. GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY, et al., Petitioners, v. MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS, et al., Respondents. 3rd District.

Mortgage foreclosure -- Conditions precedent -- Notice of default -- Error to enter summary judgment in favor of lender because issue of fact remains regarding whether lender complied with standard notice requirements contained in paragraphs 15 and 22 of mortgage -- Copy of default letter and unauthenticated “letter log history file” attached to motion for summary judgment were insufficient to prove that letter was mailed to borrower. MICHAEL J. PARKIN, JR., Appellant, v. EAGLE HOME MORTGAGE, LLC, Appellee. 5th District.

Nursing homes -- Residents' rights -- Settlement of daughter's action against nursing home concerning access to her 92-year-old mother -- Trial court acted reasonably in addressing daughter's concerns regarding enforcement of access provisions of settlement agreement in light of executive and administrative orders curtailing that access because of COVID-19 pandemic. ELIZABETH SNYDER, as the daughter and authorized agent of Judith Goldstein, Appellant, v. MERIDIAN PARK VILLAGE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Appellee. 4th District.

Patents -- Licensing -- Infringement -- Jurisdiction -- Subject matter -- Action brought by plaintiff with exclusive license to third-party patents used to create software stating causes of action against defendant for unjust enrichment for benefiting from its patrons' use of software that violates plaintiff's exclusive license; temporary and or permanent injunctive relief to enjoin defendant's violations of its exclusive rights; conversion by way of receiving illicit compensation for the unauthorized use of plaintiff's software; and violations of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act -- Trial court erred in dismissing complaint based on determination that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff's claims necessarily required a determination of the scope, validity or infringement of a patent -- Where it is clear that none of plaintiff's claims are created by federal law, those claims must meet all four factors set forth in Gunn v. Minton for federal court to have exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff's proffered state law claims -- All of plaintiff's claims necessarily raise an issue of federal law where trial court would be required to evaluate the validity and scope of the patents to some extent -- Appellate court is unable to determine whether an issue of patent or copyright law is “actually disputed” because no answer has been filed to the complaint -- Defendant's anticipatory belief that an issue of federal law will be “actually” disputed is not sufficient -- Issue of patent infringement, while necessarily raised, is not substantial enough to confer federal jurisdiction over state law claims where deciding a pure issue of federal law will not be dispositive to any of plaintiff's four causes of action; trial court's resolution will not control numerous other cases; and, because the resolution of the case will not control numerous other cases, the government has no direct interest in the dispute between the parties -- Because issues of federal law within the four counts were not substantial, court also finds that bringing these claims in federal court would disrupt Congress's intended division of labor between state and federal courts. POINT CONVERSIONS, LLC, Appellant, v. WPB HOTEL PARTNERS, LLC, Appellee. 4th District.

Real property -- Prescriptive easement -- Motion to enforce judgment -- Appeals -- Non-final orders -- Appeal of interim order which had found a prescriptive easement appurtenant but did not determine whether to enforce prescriptive easement in final judgment -- To extent interim order was appealable based on theory that it determined immediate possessory rights to the easement, appellant had thirty days to appeal from it as a nonfinal order -- To the extent the trial court's interim order either was not appealable at all or was not timely appealed, it still would have been subject to review on appeal from the final order disposing of the motion to enforce the final judgment -- Since neither party appealed final order and time to file an appeal has expired, the subject appeal is dismissed as untimely. WINBAR, L.L.C., Appellant, v. RABIA ARDAN MORRIS, Appellee. 1st District.

Rules of Juvenile Procedure -- Rules of Appellate Procedure -- Amendments -- Abortions -- Minor's petition for judicial waiver of parental notice and consent to termination of pregnancy -- Forms -- Court adopts proposed amendments to Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure which delete language regarding judicial waiver of notice only and clearly distinguish between seeking a waiver of notice and consent and consent only -- Title of form 8.987 amended to read “Petition for Judicial Waiver of Parental Notice and Consent or Consent only to Termination of Pregnancy” -- Paragraph in form 8.987 addressing appointment of counsel amended to inform minor that appointment of counsel will be at no cost to the minor as contemplated by section 390.01114(6)(a) -- Form 8.990 amended to eliminate possibility that the court could grant a waiver of notice only because waiver of consent will always be required if court grants petition -- References to petition for judicial waiver in Rules of Appellate Procedure amended to reflect amended title. IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 2.420, THE FLORIDA RULES OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE, AND THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE -- 2020 JOINT FAST-TRACK REPORT. Supreme Court of Florida.

Torts -- Discovery -- Denial -- Judicial estoppel -- Attorney-client privilege -- Appeals -- Certiorari -- Parties stipulating in federal court that no further discovery was required in order to resolve defendant's summary judgment motion asserting that plaintiff's claims against her had been settled -- Trial court departed from essential requirements of the law by relying on judicial estoppel to prohibit parties from engaging in any discovery related to defendant's affirmative defense that the underlying personal injury claims were settled prior to suit being filed -- In judicial proceedings, a party is not estopped from asserting a later inconsistent position unless the party's initial position was successfully maintained -- Defendant did not successfully maintain position that all facts had been successfully developed and presented where, although both parties stipulated that no further discovery was needed, federal judge disagreed by finding too many unanswered factual questions to permit entry of summary judgment in defendant's favor -- A party such as defendant is not estopped from relying upon such an adverse ruling and asserting any position consistent with that ruling -- Furthermore, trial court erroneously treated federal court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment as though it was a binding, substantive ruling -- Because federal court ultimately determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, it could not make binding, substantive rulings -- Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the parties' stipulation -- Trial court also departed from essential requirements of the law by applying attorney-client privilege without consideration of its waiver as a basis for banning discovery into settlement defense -- Prohibiting all discovery on settlement issue eviscerated defendant's settlement defense, resulting in irreparable harm. ALEYSSA MARIE ARROYO MARRERO, Petitioner, v. TERENCE REA, Respondent. 5th District.

Wrongful death -- Damages -- Limitation -- For purposes of section 768.24, which provides that survivor's death before final judgment limits the survivor's recovery to lost support and services to the date of his or her death, the term “final judgment” means the moment the trial court's judgment becomes final; and this finality is reached when trial court's judicial labor ends -- Survivor who died while defendant's motion for new trial was pending died before final judgment and, accordingly, recovery of damages was limited to lost support and service to date of death -- Because there was no claim for lost support or services, trial court correctly reduced damages awarded by jury to zero dollars. MICHAEL HAMBLEN, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Samantha Hamblen, Appellant, v. PILOT TRAVEL CENTERS, LLC, d/b/a FLYING J, Appellee. 1st District.

Wrongful death -- Product liability -- Tobacco -- Engle-progeny case -- Punitive damages -- Trial court properly applied pre-1999 version of section 768.73 in wrongful death action which arose upon decedent's death in 2000 -- Wrongful death complaint related back to Engle class-action complaint, and plaintiff's right to file the wrongful death action was based on decedent's status as an Engle class member -- Conflict certified. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Appellant, v. JANICE DURRANCE JONES and JULIAN DALE DURRANCE, as personal representative for the Estate of Dorothy Watson Durrance, Appellees. 2nd District.

 

The Law Lady.  For more info about us, click here.  To be added to our email circulation with MUCH, MUCH more law, click here and specify whether you wish to be added to our CRIMINAL, CIVIL, or  FEDERAL Recent Decisions of Interest.

Monday, September 21, 2015

Dissolution of marriage, writ of mandamus, and lamb roasted on a bed of rosemary and mint-infused olive oil, with heirloom tomatoes



Attorney's fees -- Costs -- Trial court properly awarded attorney's fees to city for successfully defending an action under Bert J. Harris Private Property Rights Protection Act -- Trial court erred by denying award of costs to prevailing city in inverse condemnation action in which court found that no taking had occurred -- A prevailing governmental entity in an inverse condemnation action is entitled to recover costs
CARIBBEAN CONDOMINIUM, ETC., ET AL., Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. THE CITY OF FLAGLER BEACH, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 5th District.



Dissolution of marriage -- Appeals -- Appeal from final summary judgment on breach of contract claim was untimely where notice of appeal was not filed within 30 days of rendition, and circuit court docket does not reflect that any motions for rehearing had been filed -- Attorney's fees -- Appeal of order awarding attorney's fees was timely -- Error to award attorney's fees under section 57.105 without setting forth basis for finding of entitlement and facts supporting amount awarded
MARK JACKSON, Appellant, v. MICHELLE JACKSON, Appellee. 2nd District.

Dissolution of marriage -- Equitable distribution -- Error to include in equitable distribution one of husband's pensions, which parties dissipated during pendency of action -- Error to divide furniture and furnishings where parties had stipulated that such property would not be equitably divided -- Error to fail to value or divide husband's second pension
DENISE M. TERRY, Appellant, v. DOUGLAS J. TERRY, Appellee. 4th District.

Guardianship -- Attorney's fees -- Amount -- Limitation -- Claims bill -- Appeal from refusal of guardianship court to authorize payment of attorney's fees in amount exceeding $100,000 limit placed on legal fees and costs by the legislature -- Question certified: After the enactment of section 768.28 and the adoption of Florida Senate Rule 4.81(6), is it constitutionally permissible for the Florida Legislature to limit the amount of attorneys' fees paid from a guardianship trust established by a legislative claims bill?
SEARCY DENNEY SCAROLA BARNHART & SHIPLEY, P.A.; MARK EDWARDS and MITZI DEE RODEN, as parents and natural guardians of AARON EDWARDS, a minor; WILLIAM S. FRATES, II, P.A.; EDNA L. CARUSO, P.A.; VAKA LAW GROUP, P.L.; and GROSSMAN & ROTH, P.A., Appellants, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. 4th District.



Insurance -- Automobile liability -- Uninsured motorist -- Excess coverage -- Priority of coverage -- Accident involving permissive driver of car owned by another, following which owner's liability insurer tendered its $100,000 policy limits to injured party and injured party sought coverage from its UM carrier after injured party had unsuccessfully sought payment from owner's excess liability carrier, which required that owner maintain underlying limits of $250,000 per person -- Trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of UM carrier on its third-party claim against excess carrier where UM carrier asserted throughout litigation that excess carrier's umbrella policy came first after owner's liability policy, and that UM policy was last in priority, but trial court actually held that UM carrier was responsible for $150,000 gap between limit of owner's automobile liability policy and the $250,000 threshold at which excess coverage was triggered -- UM carrier could not claim victory on ground that it requested a generic priority of coverage determination and received what it requested where the priority determination was, in fact, the opposite of what UM carrier sought
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION a/k/a USAA, MELANIE MANZO-PIANELLI and ALANA PROCTOR, Appellees. 4th District.

Insurance -- Homeowners -- Attorney's fees -- Award to insureds who prevailed in action against insurer which had denied request for appraisal -- Trial court did not abuse discretion in finding that $400 was a reasonable blended hourly rate for various attorneys who were involved in case -- 200 hours was an excessive number of hours billed, and trial court abused discretion in finding that 200 hours was reasonable -- Trial court abused discretion in awarding a multiplier where there was no showing that insureds had difficulty in obtaining competent counsel, the result obtained was not remarkable, and there were no novel or difficult factual or legal issues in case
STATE FARM FLORIDA INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, vs. JOSE ALVAREZ AND MARTHA ALVAREZ, Appellees. 3rd District.

Insurance -- Uninsured motorist -- Torts -- Automobile accident -- Damages -- Noneconomic -- Past and future pain and suffering -- Remittitur -- Trial court abused its discretion when it reduced jury awards for past and future pain and suffering against UM insurer by nearly $1 million without explaining what in the record demonstrated the need for remittitur and the reason for the amount chosen -- Comparison of pain and suffering awards in other cases does not show basis for affirming trial court in instant case -- Remand for entry of order which contains necessary findings and conclusions to support remittitur
JEFFREY P. ARNOLD and TINA ARNOLD, Appellants, v. SECURITY NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. 4th District.

Licensing -- Driver's license suspension -- Refusal to submit to breath test -- Circuit court, in its appellate capacity, applied wrong law and improperly substituted its judgment for that of hearing officer when it reweighed evidence before hearing officer and reversed suspension of driver's license on basis that licensee's refusal to take breath test was not voluntary
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY, etc., Petitioner, vs. JOSEPH S. BAIRD, Respondent. 3rd District.

Mandamus -- Denial -- Appeals -- Belated -- Appellate court has no authority to grant belated appeal in civil proceeding or to grant belated certiorari review
WILSON PEREZ, Petitioner, v. JULIE L. JONES, Secretary, Department of Corrections, Respondent. 1st District.


Torts -- Discovery -- Work product privilege -- Trial court improperly entered order compelling defendant to disclose to plaintiff post-accident photographs of area where plaintiff was injured where plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence to obtain substantially equivalent materials to the privileged photographs
SEABOARD MARINE LTD., Petitioner, vs. FARCONELLY CLARK, Repondent. 3rd District.

Torts -- Hospitals -- Medical malpractice -- Action arising out of incident in which nurse allegedly quickly and forcefully removed post-operative drainage tube from patient, unknowingly leaving section of drainage tube inside patient -- Jury instructions -- No error in refusing to give requested instruction on presumption of negligence arising from discovery of presence of foreign body -- Instruction was not appropriate where plaintiffs were able to present direct evidence of negligence -- At time of alleged negligence, patient was medicated, but was not unconscious, and patient's wife was in hospital room, and there were no genuine doubts surrounding identity of the allegedly culpable party or the events that led to tube being left inside patient by time case went to trial -- Foreign body instruction was not necessary to allow jury to resolve issues in case or supported by facts of case -- Whether foreign body instruction may have been properly applied to claim that nurse negligently failed to inspect tubing, although not applicable to claim of negligent removal, not considered by appellate court where parties did not submit proposed instructions differentiating claims despite trial court's request
SIMON DOCKSWELL and SANDRA DOCKSWELL, Appellants, v. BETHESDA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee. 4th District.

Torts -- Product liability -- Statute of repose -- Action by plaintiff who was injured when the filter of his swimming pool exploded, against the manufacturer of the filter, the installer of the pool and intermediate distributor of the filter, and the party who acted as the certified pool contractor -- Action was barred by twelve-year statute of repose -- Pool filter, a component part of the swimming pool, did not constitute an improvement to real property, and was not excepted from statute of repose
RYAN AND JESSICA DOMINGUEZ, Appellants, vs. HAYWARD INDUSTRIES, INC., CERTIFIED GUNITE COMPANY D/B/A CUSTOM POOLS, AND JOHN M. PIEKLO, Appellees. 3rd District.




The Law Lady.  For more info about us, click here.  To be added to our email circulation with MUCH, MUCH more law, click here and specify whether you wish to be added to our CRIMINAL, CIVIL, HEALTH & INSURANCE, 11th CIRCUIT, or all FEDERAL Recent Decisions of Interest.

Tuesday, July 23, 2013

Arbitration, breach of fiduciary duty, negotiable instruments, and fresh rosemary pasta with wilted arugula and Thai basil pesto



Arbitration & Mediation, Class Action, Consumer Law
This case involved arbitration proceedings stemming from plaintiff's class action suit alleging, among other things, that SouthernLINC's termination fees were unlawful penalties under Georgia law. SouthernLINC, a wireless provider, appealed the district court's denial of its motion to vacate two arbitration awards. Under the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, the court concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers under section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., either in construing the arbitration clause as he did or in certifying a class. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Southern Communications Serv. v. Thomas, U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, Docket: 11-15587, July 12, 2013, Judge: Tjoflat


Contempt -- Indirect criminal -- Where party appeared at show cause hearing without counsel, court neither advised party that he was entitled to be represented by attorney, as provided by rule 3.840(d), nor informed him that attorney could be appointed for him if he could not afford one, and party did not knowingly waive right to counsel, it was fundamental error to adjudicate party guilty of indirect criminal contempt and sentence him to six months in jail
CHRISTOPHER PODOLSKY, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. 2nd District.


Dissolution of marriage -- Equitable distribution -- Error to distribute entire value of husband's 401(k) account to wife in part as sanction for husband's acts of domestic violence against wife in front of minor children -- Although trial court also cited private school tuition arrearage as basis for award, judgment provided neither valuation for the 401(k) account nor amount of any arrearage in tuition -- Remand for further proceedings -- Value of 401(k) above tuition arrearage should be equitably distributed
MAHMOUD NASSIROU, Appellant, v. NELLIE BORBA NASSIROU, Appellee. 1st District.


Insurance -- Liability -- Trial court should have dismissed third-party complaint for declaratory judgment brought against liability insurer where there had been no settlement or verdict against insured -- Party who was allegedly injured as result of insured's negligence, but who has not obtained a settlement of verdict against insured, has no beneficial interest in insured's policy with insurer and no cause of action against insurer has accrued -- When an insurer demonstrates that the pre-suit requirements of section 627.4136, Florida Statutes, have not been met, certiorari review of an order denying a motion to dismiss is appropriate
LANTANA INSURANCE, LTD., Petitioner, vs. JOSEPH C. THORNTON, III; JEAN THORNTON; MARKHAMAT (MYA) ABDUJALALOVA; and ROBERT DEAN, Respondents. 3rd District.


Inverse condemnation -- Limitation of actions -- Trial court properly ruled that stabilization doctrine did not hold statute of limitations on inverse condemnation claim in abeyance until county abandoned its efforts to remediate flooding on property which property owner claimed was result of county road improvement activity that altered existing drainage pattern -- Limitations period commenced running at time county completed the road improvements which allegedly caused the flooding that rendered property unusable, regardless of county's promise to repair the problem -- Although owner may have been able to avoid statute of limitations by pleading and proving equitable estoppel, property owner did not raise estoppel and, therefore, the issue was waived
SHARI K. JUDKINS, Appellant, v. WALTON COUNTY, a political Subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellee. 1st District.


Municipal corporations -- Public employees -- Termination of chief of police -- Administrative proceedings -- Discovery -- Public records -- Exemptions -- Criminal investigative information -- Appeal from circuit court's ruling on amended petition in which state, in connection with pending administrative proceedings in which police chief contested termination, sought to quash subpoena of investigator with state attorney's office who had conducted an investigation into allegations raised by the police chief against some members of the city council and allegations against police chief that he had improperly deleted information from his work computer and also sought protective order preventing another subpoena from being issued to the investigator -- Circuit court, sitting in its appellate capacity, improperly held that portion of written investigative report containing mental impressions of investigator was not admissible in administrative hearing -- Where investigator's investigation and any related criminal proceedings had concluded, and no charges were filed against any of the parties mentioned in the report, the statutory exemption no longer applied and the investigator's report was a public record -- Circuit court order, which granted in part and denied in part state's amended petition, is otherwise affirmed
CITY OF AVON PARK, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee, and MICHAEL ROWAN, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 2nd District.


Torts -- Abuse of process -- Malicious prosecution -- Litigation privilege applies to claims for abuse of process and malicious prosecution against attorneys who filed complaint and briefly prosecuted case against plaintiff -- Trial court properly granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings
HAROLD E. WOLFE, JR., et al., Appellants, v. JEFFREY T. FOREMAN, et al., Appellees. 3rd District.


Torts -- Attorney's fees -- Proposal for settlement -- Law of the case -- Exceptions -- Manifest injustice -- Under circumstances, trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's request for trial level attorney's fees based on proposal for settlement although appellate court, in prior appeal, had awarded appellate attorney's fees based on the same proposal for settlement -- When appellate court issued order granting the motion for appellate fees and remanding to fix amount, instant appeal of trial court's order denying plaintiff entitlement to attorney's fees was pending before appellate court and, accordingly, the order granting appellate fees should have been conditioned upon plaintiff's ultimately prevailing in this appeal -- Because trial court did not abuse discretion by determining that plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees based on its proposal for settlement, reversal of that order based on law of the case doctrine would result in manifest injustice -- Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for attorney's fees where plaintiff initially sought damages for business income losses due to defendant's negligence, but by the time plaintiff served its proposal for settlement, it knew that it would be closing its business and also knew that it would be seeking damages for destruction of its business, not merely for its business losses, but failed to inform or notify defendant as to the change in the nature of its claimed damages
FLORIDA DIVERSIFIED FILMS, INC., Appellant, vs. SIMON ROOFING AND SHEET METAL CORP., Appellee. 3rd District.


Torts -- Banks -- Conversion -- Negligence -- Negotiable instruments -- Action by automobile dealer against depository bank and financing banks alleging mishandling of financing checks issued in connection with dealer's provision of vehicles to rental car company which ultimately went out of business without repaying money owed to dealer -- Single-payee checks -- Dealer's claim for statutory conversion of single-payee checks, which was based on allegations that, without dealer's knowledge, financing banks delivered to rental company, for the use and benefit of dealer, checks which were payable only to dealer fails for lack of delivery where there was no allegation or evidence that rental company was acting as dealer's agent -- Portion of final judgment awarding dealer damages for the face amount of single-payee checks reversed -- Two-payee checks -- Dealer failed to establish that it suffered damages with respect to several of the two-payee checks on which rental company had forged dealer's endorsement, as record showed that dealer had received payment in full for the amount of these checks -- Record supported award of damages with respect to one two-payee check for which dealer had not received payment -- Prejudgment interest -- No error in awarding prejudgment interest from date money was due until date of judgment, although interest should be recalculated on remand, consistent with appellate court's opinion
REGIONS BANK, etc., et al., Appellants, v. MAROONE CHEVROLET, L.L.C., Appellee. 3rd District.


Torts -- Contracts -- Civil theft -- Fraud -- Breach of fiduciary duty -- Trial court grossly abused discretion in vacating default final judgment against financial services company, its owner, and employee, as void for plaintiff's failure to state a cause of action -- Although civil theft complaint does not use the words “criminal intent,” allegations in the complaint sufficiently support a claim for civil theft and sufficiently allege company owner's personal involvement with failure to return funds he admitted to being escrow funds -- Final judgment as to civil theft claim to be reinstated -- Trial court did not err in holding fraud claim failed to state cause of action where fraud allegation lacked specificity -- Trial court did not err in holding breach of fiduciary duty claim failed to state cause of action where the complaint's allegations were conclusory and no ultimate facts were alleged to support that defendant owner personally misled plaintiff
LOIS RHODES, Appellant, v. O. TURNER & COMPANY, LLC, OTHEL TURNER and BYRON RAINER, Appellees. 4th District.


Torts -- Medical malpractice -- Action against defendant that provided Medicare health insurance benefits to plaintiff -- Claim that defendant's administrative personnel failed to provide authorization for plaintiff to be transported promptly to hospital for an urgent procedure to prevent a second major stroke was not a claim for medical negligence -- Medical malpractice presuit notice requirements were not applicable -- Even if claims were claims for medical malpractice, claims related back to first amended complaint, which was filed within the statute of limitations, rather than second amended complaint, which was filed after the statute of limitations had passed -- Defendant waived presuit notice requirement by failure to raise the issue in its response to first amended complaint -- Trial court erred in entering summary judgment for defendant
ANGEL ACOSTA, et al., Appellants, vs. HEALTHSPRING OF FLORIDA, INC., etc., et al., Appellees. 3rd District.




The Law Lady.  For more info about us, click here.  To be added to our email circulation with MUCH, MUCH more law, click here and specify whether you wish to be added to our CRIMINAL, CIVIL, HEALTH & INSURANCE, 11th CIRCUIT, or all FEDERAL Recent Decisions of Interest.