Corporate fiduciary duty, business records, statute of limitations, and wild boar with mustard and thyme sauce and wild lingonberries

Appeals -- Absence of transcript -- Trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of insurer in case involving proper application of policy deductible -- Although there is no transcript of pre-trial conference where ruling was made, error is apparent on face of record where explanation of review documents submitted by insurer show that insurer applied the fee schedule authorized by 627.736(5)(a)1.f. to total charges before applying PIP deductible. NORTH BROWARD CHIROPRACTIC AND WELLNESS CENTER, INC. a/a/o CRISTINA CORRIDORI, Appellant, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. 4th District.

Appeals -- Real property -- Appeal of nonfinal order scheduling sale of property ordered partitioned pursuant to final judgment -- Appeal is essentially an untimely challenge to judgment ordering partition of property where notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after rendition of that final order -- Order of partition is final at such time as court directs sale of the property -- Appeal dismissed. LISONEL PEREZ, Appellant, v. PEDRO A. JAIMOT and MARILYN JAIMOT, Appellees. 3rd District.

Attorney's fees -- Trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to defendant pursuant to prevailing party provision in contract where defendant failed to plead entitlement to contractual attorney's fees -- Exception to pleading requirement for seeking attorney's fee set forth in Stockman v. Downs is not applicable where plaintiff did not, through any action or inaction, waive any objection to defendant's failure to plead claim for contractual attorney's fees. TIMOTHY LENAHAN, Appellant, v. SHANNON LENAHAN, Appellee. 3rd District.

Civil procedure -- Relief from judgment -- Jurisdiction -- No error in vacating order setting aside mediated settlement agreement where suit had been voluntarily dismissed prior to entry of the order. GAYLE M. BURNS, Appellant, v. LAW OFFICES OF LYNWOOD ARNOLD, P.A., Appellee. 2nd District. 

Contracts -- Asset purchase agreements -- Assumption of debt -- Action alleging that defendant had assumed debt which was secured by equipment defendant purchased as part of APA -- Error to enter summary judgment in favor of plaintiff where plaintiff did not refute defendant's affirmative defense that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action against it -- Although plaintiff alleged that defendant assumed debtor's obligations under the note and repeatedly alleged that defendant breached “the note,” defendant had never been a party to the note -- Because any obligation that defendant may have to plaintiff is based solely on APA to which plaintiff was not a party, and which never mentioned the note, plaintiff has a cause of action against defendant only under third-party beneficiary theory -- Plaintiff's failure to allege requisite elements of a third-party beneficiary claim precluded entry of summary judgment in its favor -- Additionally, plaintiff did not refute affirmative defense of lack of consideration -- Reduction of APA purchase price by amount of debt did not constitute consideration, but simply ensured that defendant would not pay for the equipment twice. OTI FIBER, LLC, Appellant, v. CENTERSTATE BANK, N.A.; FLORIDA FIBER NETWORKS, LLC; DAVID ORSHAN; and DAVID S. SUAREZ, Appellees. 2nd District.

Dissolution of marriage -- Alimony -- Long-term marriage -- Trial court erred in denying former wife's request for alimony based on finding former husband had no ability to pay without also making a specific factual determination as to whether former wife had an actual need for alimony -- Moreover, when one party is entitled to permanent periodic alimony but other spouse has no current ability to pay, trial court should award a nominal sum which would give court jurisdiction to reconsider award should parties' financial circumstances change. IRENE SAMANIEGO, Appellant, v. LOUIS SAMANIEGO, Appellee. 2nd District.

Dissolution of marriage -- Attorney's fees -- Jurisdiction -- Timeliness of motion -- Trial court erred in denying wife's post-judgment motion for attorney's fees based on mistaken belief that rule 1.525 divested it of jurisdiction to entertain motion for fees filed more than 30 days after judgment -- Rule does not apply to family law cases -- Fee proceedings in family law cases are governed by section 61.16, and that statute does not impose 30-day limitation on trial court's post-judgment jurisdiction to consider fee motions. WELLY JUHL, n/k/a Welly Garza, Appellant, v. TED M. JUHL and TMJ OF PINELLAS COUNTY, INC., Appellees. 2nd District.

Employer-employee relations -- Veterans -- Retaliation -- Termination -- Employee who testified in judicial proceeding under a subpoena -- Sovereign immunity -- Action alleging wrongful termination in violation of section 92.57 and retaliation under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act -- Trial court erred in denying Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission's motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds -- Sovereign immunity bars private actions brought under USERRA against a state agency -- There is no clear and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity in section 92.57, and the waiver provisions of section 768.28 do not apply. FLORIDA FISH & WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, Appellant, v. JEFFREY HAHR, Appellee. 1st District.

Insurance -- Bad faith -- Third-party bad faith -- Contracts -- Cunningham agreements -- Limitation of actions -- Trial court erred in dismissing bad faith action based on conclusion that claim was barred by statute of limitations -- Parties' modified Cunningham agreement, which was intended to serve as the functional equivalent of the excess judgment needed to pursue third-party bad faith claim, did not constitute the functional equivalent of an excess judgment until the court approved it one year after both parties had signed it -- Trial court's conclusion that agreement did not require court approval was not supported by the plain language of the agreement, and was inconsistent with the parties' stated purpose for entering the agreement -- Because bad faith action was filed within four years from date trial court approved parties' agreement, the action was not barred by statute of limitations. WRIGHT INSURANCE AGENCY, INC. and ANTHONY WRIGHT, Appellants, v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. 2nd District.

Insurance -- Homeowners -- Directed verdict -- Error to enter directed verdict in insurer's favor on claim that insurer breached contract by not fully paying for a covered loss within 20 days of receiving insured's sworn proof of loss based on trial court's conclusion that insurer had 90 days to investigate claim -- Subsection in loss-payment provision of insurance policy which contained the 90-day limit commenced upon insurer's receipt of notice of an initial claim, not upon filing of sworn proof of loss -- Viewing facts in light most favorable to insured, insured's lawsuit was not premature where a jury could have found that insurer received notice of initial claim more than 90 days prior to the filing of insured's suit -- Even assuming suit was premature, proper procedure would have been to abate the action or dismiss without prejudice -- Trial court erred by granting insurer a directed verdict on count which alleged that insurer breached contract by not fully repairing home after it exercised its option to repair -- Based on testimony at trial, a jury could reasonably have found that insurer exercised its option to repair notwithstanding insurer's failure to give written notice as policy required. MARY IWANICKI, Appellant, v. SAFEPOINT INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. 2nd District.

Paternity -- Child custody -- Petition for determination of paternity, parental responsibility, parenting plan, time-sharing schedule, and child support by petitioner, who claims to be biological father of child born during wedlock, seeking to gain custody of child -- Trial court violated due process by entering involuntary dismissal without affording petitioner opportunity to present his full case-in-chief, including opportunity to present evidence to establish standing. ALPHA RANSOM, Appellant, v. KITREANA GRANT-VAN BROCKLIN, et al., Appellees. 3rd District.

Torts -- Corporations -- Breach of fiduciary duty -- Conversion -- Aiding and abetting -- Dismissal -- Derivative action brought by one of two shareholders in closely-held corporation alleging that the other shareholder, with assistance from his family, froze plaintiff out of corporation and transferred corporate assets to a new competing entity -- Order dismissing complaint with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action is reversed -- Discussion of the fiduciary duties of officers and directors of a corporation -- Complaint stated a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against defendant shareholder where it alleged that defendant shareholder owed a fiduciary duty as the sole operating officer; defendant shareholder breached that duty by mounting a takeover of the company, diverting corporate business relationships and revenues to a competitor, and executing documents to transfer corporate property to competitor; and that alleged breaches damaged corporation by causing its assets to be wasted and dissipated to a nominal value -- There is no authority for proposition that a complaint must plead a breach of fiduciary duty with heightened specificity to state a cause of action -- Even assuming the existence of such an elevated pleading requirement, it was satisfied in this case -- Claims against defendant shareholder's family members stated a cause of action for aiding and abetting defendant shareholder's breach of fiduciary duty -- Allegations against defendant family members were not commingled where, although defendants were sometimes collectively referred to as the “family,” complaint set forth separate counts against each defendant family member and alleged specific conduct against each individual defendant -- Complaint stated a cause of action for conversion as to some of corporation's assets, such as goodwill of the business -- Action for conversion may be based upon a wrongful takeover of intangible interests in a business venture -- No error in dismissing conversion claim as to cash, misappropriation of trade secrets, and business and contractual relationships -- Error to dismiss claim of aiding and abetting conversion based on conclusion that Florida does not recognize such a cause of action -- Because Florida recognizes aiding and abetting liability for common law torts, it follows that Florida recognizes a claim for aiding and abetting conversion. HARRY TAUBENFELD, as shareholder of PASSOVER FB., INC., Appellant, v. JONATHAN LASKO, SAMUEL LASKO, ARLENE LASKO, AVI LASKO, and LASKO GETAWAYS, LLC., Appellees. 4th District.

Torts -- Dismissal -- Denial of motion -- Appeals -- Certiorari -- Petition seeking review of order denying motion to dismiss complaint for pure bill of discovery and directing petitioner to file an answer is denied because petitioner failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. IMC MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC and JOSEPH YORK a/k/a JOSEPH ZUMWALT, Petitioners, v. JOHN DELUCA, Respondent. 4th District.

Torts -- Sanctions -- Joint and severable liability -- Final judgment imposing sanctions against two parties jointly and severally is reversed where there was no basis in record for doing so. WIDERMAN MALEK, P.L. AND CELEBRATION LAW, P.A., Appellants, v. C.H. AS SETTLOR OF THE J.F. SPECIAL NEEDS TRUST, THE CENTER FOR SPECIAL NEEDS TRUST ADMINISTRATION, INC., AS TRUSTEE OF THE J.F. SPECIAL NEEDS TRUST, Appellees. 5th District.

 

Segarra Miranda v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico
Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Docket: 20-9006
Opinion Date: August 6, 2021
Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch
Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Real Estate & Property Law
The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit (BAP) affirming the summary judgment entered by the bankruptcy court against the bankruptcy trustee (the Trustee) for an estate of two individuals, holding that an unrecorded mortgage in Puerto Rico is not a transfer of the debtor's property that is voidable by a bona fide purchaser that triggers the bankruptcy trustee's authority to avoid and preserve the lien. Jose Antonio Lopez Cancel and Carmen Nereida Medina Gonzalez acquired a property in Puerto Rico that they used as their primary residence. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico held the mortgage, but the mortgage was never recorded. The bankruptcy court treated the mortgage as a general unsecured claim covered by an earlier discharge order. The Trustee then filed this action to avoid the mortgage and preserve it on behalf of the bankruptcy estate, arguing that the unrecorded mortgage was a transfer of the debtor's property that was voidable by a bona fide purchaser. The bankruptcy court concluded that the Trustee could not avoid and preserve an unrecorded mortgage because, under Puerto Rican law, an unrecorded mortgage is not a property interest. The BAP affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no error.

 

Reid Hospital and Health Care, Inc. v. Conifer Revenue Cycle Solutions, LLC
Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket: 20-1735
Opinion Date: August 11, 2021
Judge: HAMILTON
Areas of Law: Business Law, Contracts, Health Law
Healthcare revenue cycle management contractors manage billing and behind-the-scenes aspects of patient care, from pre-registering patients to reviewing and approving documentation upon release. Reid Hospital contracted with Dell, a revenue cycle management contractor. Their contract limited both sides’ damages in a breach of contract action in the absence of willful misconduct or gross negligence. Dell sold much of its portfolio to Conifer in 2012 while Dell was still losing money on the Reid contract. Conifer began reducing staff and neglecting duties; there was a slowdown throughout the revenue-management cycle and in processing patients’ discharge forms, leading to longer hospital stays that third-party payors refused to reimburse fully. After two years, Reid took its revenue operation back in-house. Reid's consultant found significant errors in Conifer’s work. Reid sued for breach of contract, claiming that Conifer’s actions caused the hospital to lose tens of millions of dollars. The court granted Conifer summary judgment, reading the contract as defining all claims for lost revenue as claims for “consequential damages,” prohibited absent “willful misconduct.” The Seventh Circuit reversed. Even if lost revenue is often considered consequential, this was a contract for revenue collection services and did not define all lost revenue as an indirect result of any breach. Lost revenue would have been the direct and expected result of Conifer’s failure to collect and process that revenue as required under the contract. The parties did not intend to insulate Conifer entirely from damages.

 

Life Spine, Inc. v. Aegis Spine, Inc.
Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket: 21-1649
Opinion Date: August 9, 2021
Judge: St. Eve
Areas of Law: Intellectual Property, Patents
Life Spine makes and sells a spinal implant device called the ProLift Expandable Spacer System. Aegis contracted with Life Spine to distribute the ProLift to hospitals and surgeons. Aegis promised to protect Life Spine’s confidential information, act as a fiduciary for Life Spine’s property, and refrain from reverse-engineering the ProLift. Aegis nonetheless funneled information about the ProLift to its parent company, L&K Biomed to help L&K develop a competing spinal implant device. Shortly after L&K’s competing product hit the market, Life Spine sued Aegis for trade secret misappropriation and breach of the distribution agreement. The district court granted Life Spine a preliminary injunction barring Aegis and its business partners from marketing the competing product. Aegis argues that the injunction rested on a flawed legal conclusion—that a company can have trade secret protection in a device that it publicly discloses through patents, displays, and sales. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While public domain information cannot be a trade secret, a limited disclosure does not destroy all trade secret protection. Life Spine did not publicly disclose the specific information that it seeks to protect by patenting, displaying, and selling the ProLift. Life Spine’s trade secrets are not in the public domain but are accessible only to third parties who sign confidentiality agreements.

 

The Law Lady.  For more info about us, click here.  To be added to our email circulation with MUCH, MUCH more law, click here and specify whether you wish to be added to our CRIMINAL, CIVIL, or  FEDERAL Recent Decisions of Interest.

Trademarks, civil rights, and rib roast with green peppercorn-coffee-rosemary-garlic rub over sweet potato mash

Civil rights -- Due process -- Colleges and universities -- Former tenured university professor brought complaint under 42 U.S.C. section1983 alleging his termination failed to comport with procedural due process -- District court did not err in granting defendants' motion to dismiss on ground that plaintiff could not state a plausible claim for relief under Section 1983 with respect to his procedural due process claim -- Plaintiff was afforded adequate procedural due process prior to revocation of his tenure and termination of his employment where he received prior, written notice of charges against him; was represented by counsel at formal hearing before an unbiased faculty committee; presented argument and evidence on his own behalf, including cross-examination of witnesses against him; had a right to appeal his termination to Board of Regents; and submitted a written appeal to Board of Regents -- Lack of a requirement that plaintiff also receive a hearing before university president, that president review and rely on findings of faculty hearing committee or evidence presented at such hearing before making a final decision, or that plaintiff receive an in-person meeting with Board of Regents prior to his termination did not deprive plaintiff of a meaningful opportunity to be heard -- Jurisdiction -- District court had jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's procedural due process claim because plaintiff's federal action under Section 1983 was not barred by doctrine of res judicata and his procedural due process claim was actionable under Section 1983

JOY LASKAR, Ph.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. G.P. “BUD” PETERSON, individually and in his official capacity as President of the Georgia Institute of Technology, a Unit of the University System of Georgia, et al., Defendants-Appellants. 11th Circuit.

Contracts -- Real property sale -- Failure to consummate contract -- Purchaser's contract claims for damages and specific performance based on failure to consummate contract for purchase of residential property are barred by remedies limitation provision of the residential contract -- Remedies limitation provision does not contain an unreasonable disparity in remedy alternatives available to parties and thus does not lack mutuality and is enforceable -- Parties' respective remedies are not unreasonably disparate, as pertaining to the failure to consummate sale of residential property, where remedies provision limits purchasing party's remedies for seller's failure to consummate the sale to return of its deposit and out-of-pocket expenses and seller's sole and exclusive remedy for purchaser's failure to consummate the contract was terminating the contract and retaining the earnest money, thus foregoing option of enforcing contract and seeking actual damages or specific performance

INLET BEACH CAPITAL INVESTMENTS, LLC, US 98 CAPITAL INVESTMENTS, LLC, DAVID R. PEARSON, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as receiver for Peoples First Community Bank Panama City, Florida, a.k.a. FDIC, Defendant-Appellee. 11th Circuit.

Contracts -- Sales -- Accounting -- A Saudi Arabian company that contracted with a Florida-based aircraft parts dealer to sell aircraft parts on consignment sued its contracting party for breach of contract and conversion and requested an accounting -- District court abused discretion when it refused to grant plaintiff an accounting to determine amount, if any, due from defendant -- District court failed to recognize that the fiduciary nature of relationship between parties alone constituted sufficient grounds for an accounting under Florida law and erroneously concluded that an action for damages afforded an adequate remedy at law -- A court-directed accounting was appropriate remedy where defendant, as a consignee, had a fiduciary obligation to account for its handling of plaintiff's parts, parties' contracts explicitly spelled out defendant's duty to keep complete and accurate records and plaintiff's right to review those records, and defendant concededly failed to comply with its accounting and reporting obligations -- A court-directed accounting was proper remedy because plaintiff's breach of contract claim did not constitute an adequate remedy at law where discovery could not provide the means to force defendant, who possessed all relevant details regarding disposition of goods and who had substantial motivation to frustrate discovery process, to disgorge the requisite information for plaintiff to prove damages

ZAKI KULAIBEE ESTABLISHMENT, a company formed under the laws of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HENRY H. MCFLIKER, a natural person, a.k.a. Harris H. McFliker, a.k.a. Harold McFliker, AYODH PERSAUD, a natural person, a.k.a. Joe Persaud, SHAMMIE PERSAUD, a.k.a. Bebe Nafessa Persaud, a.k.a. Be Be N. Persaud, a.k.a. Bi Bi N. Persaud, AIRSPARES NETWORK, INC., a Florida corporation, DAYTONA AEROSPACE, INC., a Florida corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees. 11th Circuit.

Elections -- National Voter Registration Act -- Florida violated section 8(c)(2)(A) of NVRA, which requires state to “complete not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters,” by conducting a program to systematically remove suspected non-citizens from voter rolls within 90 days of a federal election -- Remand with instructions to district court to enter order declaring that Florida Secretary of State's actions were in violation of 90-day provision of NVRA and to grant such relief as needs and interests of justice require -- Standing -- Individual plaintiffs who had been wrongly identified as non-citizens in a prior program had standing to challenge that prior program, although they were ultimately not prevented from voting in prior election -- These individuals also had standing to prospectively challenge second attempt to remove non-citizens from voter roles because there was a realistic probability that they would be misidentified due to unintentional mistakes in data-matching process -- Organizational plaintiffs had standing to challenge program based on both a diversion-of-resources and an associational standing theory -- Mootness -- Claims related to 2012 elections are not moot because dispute is capable of repetition yet evading review

KARLA VANESSA ARCIA, MELANDE ANTOINE, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FLORIDA SECRETARY OF STATE, Defendant-Appellee, LUIS I. GARCIA, et al., Intervenor Defendants. 11th Circuit.

Labor relations -- Fair Labor Standards Act -- Overtime -- Former employees of Florida construction contractor brought suit claiming contractor failed to pay wages, including overtime, that they were entitled to receive under FLSA -- Jurisdiction -- District court had subject matter jurisdiction where face of complaint alleged federal claim for unpaid, overtime hours -- Statement of claim that plaintiffs filed under the local practices did not amend that jurisdictional basis out of the complaint -- Plaintiffs' failure to reiterate their unpaid-overtime-hours claim in statement of claim document is not controlling -- Statement of claim document does not have status of a pleading and is not an amendment of complaint under Rule 15 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

ARLE CALDERON, MANNY FERNANDEZ, ADALBERTO GALO, LUIS MOLINA, ANDY W. DEL TORO, SERGIO D. HERNANDEZ, PEDRO JOSE MARTINEZ, WILLIAMS ARIELLO GALANTINO, JOSE DE LA CRUZ CARDENAS, on their own behalf and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BAKER CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Florida profit corporation, et al., Defendants, FORM WORKS/bAKER JV, LLC., a foreign profit corporation, Defendant-Appellee. 11th Circuit.

Trademarks -- Infringement -- Online education -- Standing -- Florida Virtual School, a Florida state agency established for development and delivery of online education, appeals from dismissal of its trademark infringement suit against a national online education provider for lack of standing based on conclusion that only Department of State has standing to sue for infringement of plaintiff's trademarks -- Florida Virtual School has authority, and standing, to file action to protect its trademarks

FLORIDA VIRTUALSCHOOL, a Florida Educational Institution, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. K12, INC., a Delaware Corporation, K12 FLORIDA, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company, Defendants-Appellees. 11th Circuit.

The Law Lady.  For more info about us, click here.  To be added to our email circulation with MUCH, MUCH more law, click here and specify whether you wish to be added to our CRIMINAL, CIVIL, HEALTH & INSURANCE, 11th CIRCUIT, or all FEDERAL Recent Decisions of Interest.